



The Human Development Approach: An Overview

Frances Stewart

To cite this article: Frances Stewart (2019): The Human Development Approach: An Overview, Oxford Development Studies, DOI: [10.1080/13600818.2019.1585793](https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2019.1585793)

To link to this article: <https://doi.org/10.1080/13600818.2019.1585793>



Published online: 04 Mar 2019.



Submit your article to this journal [↗](#)



View Crossmark data [↗](#)



The Human Development Approach: An Overview

Frances Stewart

Oxford Department of International Development, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK

ABSTRACT

The human development (HD) approach puts the improvement of people's lives as the central objective of development. This paper provides an overview of major aspects of the approach. It shows how it emerged with the evolution of development thought and a widening of development objectives. The paper explores the two-way relationship between HD and the rival objective, economic growth, is explored and broad characteristics of countries that have been exceptionally successful or unsuccessful, countries with three country cases considered in greater depth. The paper identifies major dimensions of HD, beyond the three elements included in the Human Development Index (HDI) and shows they are poorly captured by the HDI. An overview of global change on HD dimensions from 1980 to 2015 gives a mixed picture with progress on basic HD, uneven trends in some areas, and notable worsening on the environmental dimension. In conclusion, the paper discusses some outstanding issues which need more attention.

KEYWORDS

Human development; capabilities; economic growth; basic needs; inequality

Introduction

The human development (HD) approach puts the improvement of people's lives as the central objective of development. UNDP's 1990 *Human Development Report* is generally credited with initiating the approach, though it had earlier origins.¹ According to the 1990 report 'Human Development is a process of enlarging peoples' choices. The most critical ones are to lead a long and healthy life, to be educated and to enjoy a decent standard of living. Additional choices include political freedom, guaranteed human rights, and self-respect' (UNDP, 1990, p. 10).

This paper provides an overview of important features of the approach drawing on (Stewart, Ranis, & Samman, 2018) where these (and other) issues are discussed in more depth.² The paper considers the following topics: it starts with an account of the origins of the approach, showing how the HD approach emerged as a consequence of the evolution of development thought in the light of changing circumstances and priorities (Section 1). Making HD the overriding goal of development is often contrasted with that of economic growth, which has long been accepted as the dominant objective. Section 2 considers the relationship between HD and national income, showing a circular relationship such that economic growth supports improvements in HD, and these in turn contribute to economic growth. Using improvements in 'basic HD' (interpreted here as health and education) as well as economic growth as the criteria of success, Section 3 discusses characteristics of countries that have been exceptionally successful or unsuccessful in terms of HD from 1980 to 2014, and then selects three examples of successful country performance and explores their features in more depth, discussing the agents of change. Yet basic HD encompasses only a subset of dimensions of HD, considering the manifold characteristics of flourishing lives.

Section 4 identifies broader dimensions of HD and explores whether the Human Development Index (HDI) is a good proxy measure of these dimensions or whether additional measures are needed. Section 5 makes a bold attempt to provide an overview of progress on the major dimensions of HD, identified in Section 4, in the world as a whole over recent decades, Section 6 concludes with a discussion of some important outstanding issues that have been relatively neglected in both analysis and policy. This suggests some directions where future research is needed

Section 1: the origin of the approach: from growth to human development

The HD approach represents a major change from the widely accepted views of post-colonial decision-makers and advisers in the 1950s and 1960s, who made growth in per capita incomes the central objective of development. The HD approach did not represent a sudden or complete break from previous thinking; rather, it was the outcome of a process of evolution in ideas, policies and outcomes. This section traces this movement of thought about development, broadly from growth to human development.

The idea of making flourishing human lives the central objective of development which emerged in the 1970s and 1980s and was crystalized in the 1990 *Human Development Report* was not, of course, a completely novel one. Indeed, one can go back to Aristotle, and the role he gave to the good life or *Eudaimonia*. A society's achievements, he argued should be judged by its success in helping people to lead flourishing lives. However, the analysis here starts in the 1950s, when concern with improving the situation of people in poor countries came to the fore, as countries gained political independence. Post-colonial decision-makers (and advisers from the West) made economic growth the overriding economic objective, seeing this as the prime mechanism to enable countries to catch up with the economically advanced countries. Growth in per capita incomes was to be achieved by raising the investment rate, via import-substituting industrialisation, often including a National Plan (Lewis, 1954; Mahalanobis, 1953; Rostow, 1960).

The strategy was broadly successful in its own terms (Figure 1). Growth rates increased, quite dramatically in some cases – East Asia in particular enjoyed a major acceleration in growth. The share of national income devoted to gross investment increased in most places, as well as the share of industry, and per capita income growth, which had been abysmally low in the previous half century, rose. Moreover, beyond economic growth, human indicators also improved. Adult literacy rose and infant mortality rates fell.


Nonetheless, despite the comparatively good performance, especially among middle-income developing countries, some major problems emerged, partly as a result of this success. In particular, there was concern with the prevalence of high levels of unemployment and under-employment. Not only did the growth strategy generate relatively few jobs, since it was based on capital-intensive technology imported from the West (Stewart, 1977), but the modern sector jobs that were generated created an incentive for people to migrate to the towns to seek the comparatively high wage jobs there (Harris & Todaro, 1970). Some migrants became openly unemployed and many more joined the informal sector with low productivity and short hours. Moreover, the growth did not appear to reduce poverty; in fact, the absolute numbers in poverty rose as population growth accelerated and the poverty rate remained broadly unchanged. The International Labour Organization summed up the situation:

...it has become increasingly evident, particularly from the experience of the developing countries, that rapid growth at the national level does not automatically reduce poverty or inequality or provide sufficient productive employment. (ILO, 1976, p. 15)


Put briefly, trickle down from economic growth had been insufficient. Moreover, the economic independence sought was elusive, as heavy dependence on developed countries for capital and technology persisted.

This led to widespread criticism of the growth objective. As Dudley Seers wrote,


Average annual growth rate, % p.a.



Gross investment as % of GDP



Industry value-added as % GDP



Adult literacy, %




Figure 1. Development Progress from 1950 to 1980.

Source World Development Indicators, accessed February 2018.

Note: E. Asia includes Pacific; LAC is Latin America and the Caribbean; S. Asia is South Asia; SSA is Sub-Saharan Africa.

The questions to be asked about a country's development therefore are: 'What has been happening to poverty? To unemployment? To inequality... Fulfillment of human potential requires ...adequate education levels, freedom of speech, citizenship...' (Seers, 1969, p. 3)

A search for an alternative to economic growth began. The first attempt was made by Dudley Seers himself. In a Mission he led to Columbia, he made employment the central objective (ILO, 1970). Yet employment as such, while an important aspect of human dignity and a source of income as well as a contributor to output, seemed too narrow an objective. As an alternative, 'Redistribution with growth' (RwG) was advocated by a group of economists from the Institute of Development Studies at Sussex and the World Bank (Chenery, Ahluwalia, Bell, Duloy, & Jolly, 1979), emanating from the analysis of an ILO Mission to Kenya led by Richard Jolly and Hans Singer (ILO, 1972). This retained the emphasis on income but advocated redistributing the fruits of economic growth to the poor in the form of productive assets. They also suggested recalibrating the measure of national income, so that it would be weighted according to who received the incomes, with greater weight given to poorer groups. The RwG strategy, however, had both political and economic flaws and it was never implemented. Politically, the heavy progressive taxation involved was unlikely to be accepted. In economic terms, it seemed likely that the strategy would reduce the rate of economic growth on which it depended, since the additional incomes generated were to be taken away from existing investors, and growth could only be sustained if the assets distributed to poorer people were highly productive.

The Basic Needs (BN) approach, initiated by the ILO and adopted for a short while by the World Bank, offered a more feasible alternative (ILO, 1976; Stewart, 1985; Streeten, Burki, Haq, Hicks, & Stewart, 1981). Advocates of BN argued that priority should be given to ensuring that the basic needs of every person are met. These needs included such elements as food, shelter, water,

clothing, education and so on. Incomes of the poor were an important means to promote BN fulfilment, but insufficient since public goods were essential to provide health, education and sanitation, for example. Non-material elements were also included, such as political rights and employment (ILO, 1976). Although the approach was criticized for ‘commodity fetishism’ (Sen, 1999), Streeten et al. point out that what was aimed for was ‘to provide all human beings with the *opportunity* for a full life’ (1981, p. 21). The particular goods and services, incomes and public goods, that would help meet this objective is an empirical issue, and would vary according to context (Stewart, 1985). The World Bank under Robert McNamara was influenced by the BN approach and redirected some programmes to health, education and shelter. It was not adopted explicitly by any developing country, although a number of countries (including, for example, Costa Rica and Sri Lanka), had already been implementing elements of the BN approach in their own strategies.

However, in the 1980s there was a radical change in direction. Political changes in the United States and United Kingdom, combined with the debt crisis in many developing countries, which became critical in the early 1980s, led to a move away from human-oriented objectives and even from economic growth, towards stabilization and adjustment in development policy. Keynesianism, which had been supportive of government interventions in the economy, including planning and import-substituting industrialization, was replaced by a monetarist *laissez-faire* pro-market philosophy in the developed countries, and this was imparted to the developing countries by the conditionalities of the IMF and the World Bank. These institutions were able to determine the economic strategy of many developing countries because the high levels of debt incurred by most countries in Latin America and Africa (but mainly not in Asia) forced them to seek their support. Throughout the 1980s, the pro-market Washington consensus policies – elaborated by (Williamson, 1989) – were supreme, dismantling government controls, privatizing industries, eliminating import quotas and reducing tariffs, as well as reducing and sometimes abolishing minimum wages, and restricting the role of trade unions. Budget imbalances were to be eliminated, mainly by reducing public expenditure, while revenue raising was reoriented from direct to indirect taxes. All this, together with worsening terms of trade, led to a fall in per capita incomes in the regions worst affected (notably, Africa and Latin America), a fall in investment, and deteriorating human conditions, including rising poverty and inequality and stalled improvements in health and education (Cornia, Jolly, & Stewart, 1986; Kakwani, 1995; Stewart, 1995; Woodward, 1992).

The need to put human flourishing at the centre of development objectives was underlined by these negative trends. At the same time Amartya Sen’s development of the capabilities approach provided a theoretical structure for the move to a human-oriented approach (Sen, 1985, 1999). Sen argued that the aim of development should be the expansion of capabilities (sometimes termed ‘freedoms’), or the array of beings and doings that individuals might enjoy. Capabilities range from the ability to be well-nourished or well-educated to more specific activities such as being able to ride a bicycle, or read French literature, or play football. Sen emphasized the value of *agency* or a person’s autonomy – every individual should be able to choose which capabilities they wished to pursue. He criticized the focus on incomes as being *consequentialist* (neglecting how a particular end was achieved and focusing only on outcomes); and involving *physical condition neglect*, such that incomes might be high despite poor living conditions, including ill-health.

The HD approach emerged out of the 1970s focus on human flourishing and, in particular, the BN and capabilities approaches. The deterioration in living conditions of the poor that occurred during the 1980s underlined the importance of a redirection towards a focus on human well-being. The concept of Human Development was initiated and developed in the course of the North-South Roundtable meetings at this time, in which Mahbub ul Haq played a prominent role. Consequently, the UNDP invited Mahbub ul Haq to launch a *Human Development Report*. He convened a team to work on the report, consisting of Amartya Sen and a number of people who had worked on BN and then on HD in the course of the Roundtable discussions, including Gustav Ranis, Paul Streeten and myself.

The first report laid down some critical aspects of HD – ‘the process of development should at least create a conducive environment for people, individually and collectively, to develop their full potential and to have a reasonable chance of leading productive and creative lives in accord with their needs and interests’ (UNDP, 1990, p. 1). Furthermore, the ‘basic objective of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives’ (p. 9). Freedom is emphasized as an essential aspect. The focus, therefore, is on enlarging choices rather than directly on improving outcomes. Raising incomes is not the overriding development goal but an important means to achieve the objective of HD. The Report quotes Emmanuel Kant: ‘so act as to treat humanity... in every case as an end, and never a means only’ (UNDP, 1990, p. 9). The HD approach encompasses all sections of society, but there is a heavy emphasis on the situation of the poor, whose potential for living full and flourishing lives is most limited.

Compared with the growth maximisation goal, economic expansion is seen as a means to advance HD, rather than an end in itself. Employment too is a means to advance HD, but it is also an aspect of HD since being employed contributes directly to human fulfilment, although only if the employment is ‘decent’ (ILO, 1999), not in slave-like conditions. The fulfilment of basic needs is a central component of HD, but the HD approach goes well beyond the basic in two ways: first, it includes aspects of human flourishing which are not normally considered to be basic. Secondly, the approach is not confined to developing countries but applies globally. The major contribution of Sen’s capabilities approach to HD is the emphasis on choice and agency as well as moving beyond the basic. The HD approach, however, has a pragmatism that the capabilities approach sometimes seems to lack, by focussing particularly on the needs of the poor and adding up outcomes so as to assess country performance.

The first *Human Development Report* introduced the Human Development Index (HDI) as a measure of country achievements on HD. It has three elements: life expectancy; a measure of education; and a measure of per capita incomes, adjusted for Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) while incomes are discounted at higher levels. The precise way these three variables are measured and the method of aggregating them into a single index has changed over the years, but the index still includes just these three elements. The HDI has been criticized from many perspectives. One frequent criticism is that income per capita is included despite the intention to get away from income as the objective. The justification given in the Report was that the income element represents ‘command over resources needed for decent living’ (UNDP, 1990, p. 12). In addition, the index was criticized because it does not allow for inequalities in distribution; this was mainly due to data limitations. Moreover, by limiting the index to just these three elements, the HDI failed to capture many important dimensions of HD, as will be explored in [Section 4](#) of this paper. Nonetheless, despite its widely acknowledged deficiencies as a comprehensive measure of HD, the HDI has played an important role in drawing attention to the approach and in steering policy makers away from exclusive reliance on GDP per capita towards human-oriented goals. Moreover, since 1990, successive Reports have added a number of measures, in addition to the HDI, which capture some other dimensions of HD, including an inequality-adjusted HDI, measures of gender inequality (GEM and the GDI),³ a human-poverty index (HPI) and a measure of multidimensional poverty (MPI).

Successive Reports have focused on different aspects of HD, illustrating its broad range. These include, for example, human security (1994); consumption (1998); Human Rights (2000); new technologies and HD (2001); democracy (2002); cultural liberty (2004); climate change (2007/8); and work (2014). The Report’s interpretation of HD is thus essentially multidimensional. The eight Millennium Development Goals, agreed with global support in 2000, can be seen as embodying many aspects of HD. The adoption of the MDGs, and later the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a powerful indication of the success of the approach in steering global decision makers towards a multidimensional human-centred approach to development.

2. HD and economic growth

As shown earlier, the HD approach emerged as a response to theoretical and practical problems arising from adopting economic growth as the prime objective of development. National income is not a good measure of economic welfare as it neglects social interactions, externalities and distribution. Moreover, after a period of sustained economic growth in many countries from 1950, poverty remained high and there were severe problems of un- and under-employment. Yet this does not mean that economic growth is irrelevant. Indeed, it is clearly helpful for advancing HD, just as HD is also an important determinant of economic growth.

This section therefore explores the two-way interaction between advances in HD and economic growth (EG). We are interpreting HD here as basic HD, including health and education. We exclude the income element in the HDI, since it is obvious that this would be positively related to EG. EG generates the resources that support public expenditure on BN-type goods and services, as well as the household incomes that enable households to meet nutrition and other needs, all of which contribute to HD. Equally, with higher HD, involving more educated, better fed and healthier people, the economy is likely to be more productive, as argued by those who point to the importance of human capital for economic growth (Schultz, 1963, 1993). Hence we expect two-way causation between EG and HD.

Figure 2 differentiates two chains – Chain A from national income (GNP) to HD, and Chain B, from HD to GNP, leading to a form of circular causation. As illustrated in Figure 2, there are links in both chains which determine the relationships. In Chain A, links occurring via the public sector are the expenditure ratio (the proportion of national income going to public expenditure); the social allocation ratio (the proportion of total public expenditure revenue going to sectors most likely to promote HD); and the social priority ratio (the proportion of social sector expenditure going to HD-priorities), which together determine the proportion of national income spent by the public sector on goods and services likely to enhance basic HD. Turning to households, the incomes of poorer households depend on the level of national income and its distribution across households; households' expenditure patterns then determine how much they spend on HD-type goods and services. HD outcomes are a function of the relevant goods and services provided by the public sector, expenditures of households and how efficiently these are combined in what we termed the 'HD improvement function' (HDIF). The latter is likely to depend in part on female education, since more educated women are likely to have more influence over household decisions leading to greater uptake of HD goods and services, and they are likely to make more effective use of such goods and services.

Focusing on Chain B, linking HD and GNP, the relationship between the two is likely to depend on the efficiency of economic policies, the investment rate and possibly the distribution of income, which has been found to be a determinant of economic growth in a number of studies (Bruno, Ravallion, & Squire, 1999; Persson, Tabellini et al., 1994). Hence while there is a strong presumption that higher growth will generate more HD improvement, and vice versa, the actual relationship also depends on these other factors, so that some countries are likely to have stronger relationships between HD and EG than others.

There is a large amount of empirical evidence on these relationships. Many micro studies have shown that as people's incomes go up, poor people spend more on food and have better health services, while children have better education. There is also evidence on the nature of the human development improvement function showing that female education improves health and education outcomes for a given level of income and availability of services; and that there is synergy between health and education: if health is better, people are more likely to go to school, and if they are more educated they are more likely to be well nourished. On Chain B, there is a massive literature on the returns to education, health and nutrition, indicating that at least at the micro level we would expect the links described above.




Figure 2. The HD-GNP cycle.

Cross-country evidence at a macro-level we undertook also provides supportive evidence.⁴ Growth in national income (measured by GDP) is associated with improved human development, and the relationship is stronger the higher the social expenditure ratio. It is also stronger the greater gender parity in education. However, despite expectations, there is not evidence that greater equality, as measured by the Gini coefficient, improves human development outcomes. On Chain B, we found a strong correlation between the initial level and changes in human development and subsequent economic growth, which was stronger the greater the investment ratio. Although again, many studies have found that more equality generates greater economic growth, we did not find evidence for this.⁵ In both chains, there is a catch-up element, which means the lower the initial level of HD (or GNP) the greater the improvement, holding other factors constant. In regional terms, Africa tends to do less well on both chains than the other regions, and Latin America does less well on Chain B – that is, on economic growth. We found synergies among the variables, with improved education, improving nutrition and health and conversely worse performance on one worsening the others.

As a result of the two way causation, cycles of development are likely, since a country that is doing well in improving HD is likely to do well on EG and this in turn will tend to promote HD in a virtuous cycle. Conversely, a country which starts in a weak position on one aspect is likely to get into a vicious cycle, with poor performance on HD leading to poor performance on EG. Following this logic, Figure 3 divides countries into four categories in terms of their performance on improvements in HD and EG from 1970 to 2014: a vicious cycle quadrant (South-west); a virtuous cycle (North-east); HD-lopsided North-west – when the country did particularly well on Human Development but not so well on EG and EG-lopsided (South-east – when a country did particularly




Figure 3. HD-Economic growth patterns, 1970–2014.

well on economic growth but not so well on HD). The axes on the diagram depict the average achievements for the period 1970–2014. The countries were classified as doing particularly well, or poorly, according to whether their performance was above or below the average for countries as a whole. As can be seen, Asian countries tend to be in the virtuous cycle category, Latin American countries in the HD-lopsided, and many African countries in the vicious cycle category. The EG-lopsided quadrant has rather few observations, as it does not seem to be a stable category.

We can also trace country placement in the four quadrants, decade-by-decade. The exercise permits identification of countries were particularly successful or particularly unsuccessful in combining improvement in HD and EG. We defined two types of exceptional success: (i) *sustained success*, occurring if a country maintained a position in the virtuous quadrant for at least three of the four decades; and (ii) *transition success*, occurring if a country moved up over the decades from the vicious cycle into the virtuous one. The latter experience is particularly relevant to countries performing poorly, as it suggests paths out of poor performance. Similarly, we can identify two types of poor performance: (i) *persistent weak performance*: where a country is in the vicious cycle category over three or four decades; and (ii) *worsening performance*, where country performance deteriorates and moves from the virtuous cycle into the vicious one. Table 1 shows the countries found to be exceptionally good and exceptionally poor performers in these terms, over these decades.

Table 1. Country success and failure in Basic HD – from 1970s to 2000s.

Sustained improvement—virtuous for three or four decades	Successful transition, from vicious to virtuous	Continuous poor performance—vicious for three or four decades	Negative transition from virtuous to vicious
Singapore	Bangladesh	Papua N. Guinea	Ecuador
Thailand	Nepal	Pakistan	Guatemala
Sri Lanka	Ethiopia	DRC	Algeria
China	Mozambique	Senegal	Iraq
S.Korea	Botswana	Togo	Saudi Arabia
Malaysia	Rwanda	Burundi	
Indonesia	Tanzania	Cote d'Ivoire	
Cuba	Uganda	Mali	
Uruguay	Bolivia	Nigeria	
Egypt	Peru	Sierra Leone	
Tunisia		Zimbabwe	

3. Characteristics of success and failure

It is possible to identify some patterns of good and poor performance by looking at some characteristics of the countries identified in [Table 1](#) as exceptionally good or poor performers.

For exceptionally good performance, we found the following patterns.

- *High and equitable growth*: examples are South Korea and Sri Lanka, which had very good and fairly well-distributed growth, average social expenditure, and exceptionally good gender equity. Gender equity is, of course, desirable in itself and is also likely to promote HD, since the greater gender equity, the greater female influence on household decisions, which tends to increase household expenditures on HD-elements.
- *High social expenditure*: some countries, for example Cuba and Mozambique, had weak growth, but exceptionally high social expenditure, moderate inequality and, again, very good gender equity.
- *An intermediate path*: these countries were good, but not exceptional, on growth, social expenditure and equity. Examples are Bangladesh and Nepal. This is perhaps the most encouraging path, as it is the easiest to duplicate.

When it comes to weak performers:

- *Weak all round performance*: countries such as the DRC and Myanmar had poor (or even negative) growth, low social expenditure and unequal distribution.
- *Weak performance despite moderate social expenditure*: these countries had average social expenditure, but this did not offset the low or negative growth and high inequality. Examples were Cote d'Ivoire and Zimbabwe.
- *Weak performance despite growth*: these countries experienced unequal growth combined with low social expenditure – for example, Ecuador and Guatemala.

Success and failure have here been defined purely in terms of basic HD. Looking at some broader characteristics of HD, we found no systematic relationships. Many success countries have had very limited political freedoms – for example, Cuba and China. This was also true of some weak performers, such as DRC, Pakistan and Zimbabwe. Moreover, some weak performers had good political freedoms, such as Papua New Guinea and Ecuador. Most surprising, some of the successful countries experienced significant political violence over the years – for example, Sri Lanka and Peru. However, in the case of Sri Lanka, violence was mostly confined to one part of the country, while Peru was a good transition country, able to improve in the post-conflict period, and the case of Mozambique was similar. The DRC is a country where conflict was very high and seriously undermined progress of both EG and HD. Female empowerment was generally better

among the successes, as expected, but it was not particularly poor among the failures. Environmental sustainability was worse among the successes, as expected, since growth tends to lead to worse environmental outcomes.

Three examples of success

It is illuminating to explore some successful examples in more depth, so as to identify some of the underlying aspects, in particular the agents of change. The examples chosen are Bangladesh, Ethiopia and Thailand. Bangladesh' progress was a little tortuous, starting in the vicious quadrant in the 1970s largely because of the war of independence, but eventually reaching the virtuous quadrant in the 2000s. Ethiopia also had a civil war, and was very poor in the 1980s, ending the conflict in the 1990s, and then moving into the virtuous category. Thailand, in contrast, was an exceptional performer throughout the decades.

An interesting feature of these cases is the different agents of change underlying their success. In Thailand, success was led by progressive bureaucrats, especially in health. Some young doctors formed an association in 1978 (the Rural Doctors Association) as a pressure group to improve the health of poor people. Many of these doctors eventually became dominant in the central government health bureaucracy (Harris, 2015). At that point (turn of the century) a progressive government was elected, led by Thaksin Sinawatra, which introduced universal and mainly free healthcare. The legislation stated: 'A person shall enjoy an equal right to receive standard public health service and the indigent shall have the right to receive free medical treatment' (2002, National Health Security Act). Thaksin also enacted a debt moratorium for poor farmers, soft loans for community development, and housing for the poor, partly in response to pressures from local organisations of slum dwellers and the rural poor. The question is whether these policies will be sustained over the long run in the changed political context.

Turning to Bangladesh, there were three major agents of change: the NGOs, the private sector and women. The NGOs are very extensive and effective in Bangladesh, including BRAC, the Grameen Bank and many others. The NGOs provide health services, education and microcredit mainly directed towards women. According to World Bank statistics, over 40 per cent of primary school children and around 95 per cent of secondary children were in what are classified as private schools in 2015, which includes those provided by NGOS (although these may be overestimates). In Thailand, in contrast, 10.5% of secondary enrolment and 20% at the primary level was private in 2015. In any case, NGOs in Bangladesh have made a huge contribution. Secondly, the private sector, particularly small-scale entrepreneurs in textiles, created a very large amount of employment, especially for women, while the textile exports powered economic growth. The industry was estimated to account for 4 million workers in 2014, of whom 80% were female (Ghosh, 2014). The third agent of progress in HD in Bangladesh are women themselves, empowered by education, employment and credit. 'The garments industry has created the rise of financially independent and successful women in Bangladesh and is responsible for a dramatic shift in paradigm for Bangladeshi society' (Hyder, 2009, p. 2). As one woman worker said: 'Women used to be helpless. They would have to wait for whatever their husbands gave them and when they choose to give it to them. ... Now five women have five mobiles between them, they don't need to rely on anyone' (Kabeer, Mahmud, & Tasneem, 2011, p. 33).

In Ethiopia, the process of advancing HD was more top down, led both by the government and the aid community. A progressive government, which had emerged from the civil war, was ideologically committed to improving people's condition, and was supported by massive aid, which peaked at 38% of GNP in 2003. Infrastructural investment contributed to both rural development and the social sectors. New social protection systems were established – in particular the Productive Safety Net programme, which is the largest such scheme in Africa.

Economic strategies in the three countries were similar: all showed large rises in investment, and policies were mostly market oriented, but guided by the state, which played a particularly large role in Ethiopia. Each put resources into agriculture and supported labour intensive exports. This combination was responsible for the relatively equitable growth. As far as social allocations are concerned, however, there were very different patterns. Total government expenditure as

a percentage of GDP was quite low in Bangladesh, high in Thailand and moderate in Ethiopia. The social allocation ratio, or the proportion of total expenditure going to health and education, was almost half in Ethiopia, just over a third in Thailand, and a fifth in Bangladesh. As a result, Bangladesh had a very low proportion of state expenditure as a share of national income going to the social sectors, which was compensated for by NGO expenditures. On the other hand, Thailand and Ethiopia both had high ratios, but for different reasons: in the case of Ethiopia, it was because they spent such a large proportion of public expenditure on social sectors, much of it aid-financed; in Thailand reasonably high revenue supported the social expenditure.

None of the three countries showed exceptional performance on political freedoms, though it was during a democratic phase that Thailand introduced progressive reforms. None of the three were free from corruption. The three cases exemplify two findings from the more general analysis of success: first, that there is no unique pattern, but different paths; and secondly, that success in basic HD is not necessarily associated with success in broader dimensions. The next section explores this issue more intensively.

4. HD beyond the HDI

The HDI measures only basic aspects of HD. For a comprehensive assessment of achievements on HD, it is important to ascertain whether the HDI is also a good indicator of broader dimensions of HD. To do this, we first need to identify important dimensions that contribute to human flourishing, beyond the basic ones. This question has been the topic of innumerable philosophical investigations. Indeed, (Alkire, 2002) identified 39 exercises identifying dimensions of human flourishing just between 1938 and 1999. To make the task manageable we selected seven approaches advanced between 1971 and 2011 categorizing major dimensions of human wellbeing (see Table 2). The various approaches arrived at the categories on the basis of different types of reasoning: for example, Doyal and Gough (1991) identified those aspects of life that, they argued, contributed to the avoidance of harm, while Nussbaum (2000) justified her categories on the basis of an overlapping consensus, and Burchardt and Vizard (2011) used internationally agreed Human Rights as the basis.

These seven approaches identified and broadly agreed on the following categories: bodily wellbeing, material wellbeing, mental health, mental development, work, security, empowerment, political freedom and social relations. Finnis, Boyle, and Grisez (1987) also identified spiritual wellbeing and Nussbaum (2000) identified respect for animal species. Omitting the last two categories (partly for reasons of data), we selected 12 categories, on the basis of these enquiries, to encompass the major dimensions of HD as shown in Table 3. In selecting the dimensions, we redefined and subdivided some categories (e.g. security is divided into economic and political security). We also added two categories that seem of intrinsic importance to HD: inequalities and environmental conditions. Both these can be thought of as meta-categories, which apply to all the other categories.

Table 2. Seven approaches to identifying dimensions of human flourishing.

Author	Philosophical justification
Rawls, 1971	Deliberative rationality – general facts about human wants and abilities and the necessities of social interdependence.
Finnis et al., 1987	Practical reasoning – ‘critical reflection about the planning of one’s life’
Doyal & Gough, 1991	Avoid serious harm
Naraya, Patel, Schafft, Rademacher, & Koch-Schulte, 2000	Views of the poor
Camfield, 2005	Consult people on characteristics of quality of life
Nussbaum, 2007	Overlapping consensus – what people with different religions and philosophies agree on
Burchardt & Vizard, 2011	Internationally agreed Human Rights

Table 3. Dimensions of HD and their relationship to the HDI.

Category	Indicator(s) ^a	Indicator(s) highly correlated with HDI ^b
Basic HD	HDI	HDI
Mental well-being	Life satisfaction; male suicide rate; prisoners per population	Life satisfaction
Empowerment	Monetary poverty, international poverty line; contraception use; GEM; ratio of female/male secondary education; union density	Poverty rate; contraception use.
Political freedom	Political/civil liberties; political terror; juridical independence	None
Social relations	Value of friends and of family; tolerance of neighbours; divorce rate	None
Community wellbeing	AIDs deaths p. pop; rule of law; alcohol consumption; natural disasters; tolerance of neighbours	AIDs deaths; rule of law
Inequalities	Income Gini; Horizontal inequality; rural-urban inequality; GDI; health inequality.	None
Work conditions	Unemployment; employment conditions; informal sector ratio; minimum wages; child labour	Child Labour
Leisure conditions	Phone availability; cinema attendance	Phone availability
Economic security	GDP cycle; CPI cycle; proportion of portfolio investment; terms of trade fluctuations; access to social security	Social security
Political security	Political violence; refugees flows	None
Environment	Environmental sustainability index	None

a.Data covered 1980–2002; most was from 1999 to 2002; and included all developing countries for which data was available – this varied considerably across indicators.

b.A rank order correlation coefficient of 0.6 or above.

Source: derived from (Stewart et al., 2018) Chapter 6 (which contains more information on methodology, sources etc.)

Since the aim was to explore whether the HDI at a country level could reasonably proxy as a measure of each category, it was necessary to identify indicators to measure achievements on each of the categories. We chose several indicators for most categories to capture their complexity, with our choice being heavily circumscribed by data availability. The HDI was correlated with each indicator, and where the rank correlation coefficient was above 0.6, we concluded that the HDI could be regarded as a reasonable proxy measure of that indicator. Table 3 shows the categories and the indicators selected, identifying those where the correlation with HDI was above 0.6.

This exercise shows that the HDI is a poor measure of most of the non-basic categories of HD. Indeed, for political freedom, social relations, inequalities, political security and environmental conditions, none of the indicators used correlated highly with the HDI. Hence, for a full assessment of HD it is essential to go beyond the HDI and identify additional measures of performance. Different categories, indicators and dates could be explored, but the basic conclusion of weak correlations across different categories is likely to be robust. This has also been shown in other investigations (see Ranis, Stewart, & Samman, 2009), as well as in country performance, as shown earlier.

Section 5: progress on multiple dimensions of HD, 1980–2015

This section reviews global progress on the many dimensions of HD identified above. Assessing progress on these dimensions, some of which are intrinsically difficult to measure, is unavoidably based on imperfect indicators and data. Moreover, the multiple indicators for most dimensions do not always tell the same story. These problems must be borne in mind in interpreting the findings. In summary, we get a mixed picture as one might expect with such diverse dimensions: there is near universal progress on some dimensions, a more uneven situation on others, and negative trends on one important aspect – environmental conditions.

Universal progress in basic HD

The most unambiguous progress was shown in basic HD, as measured by the HDI, which improved in every country over these years. But, the rate of advance varied, as can be seen from Figure 4 showing differing progress by region. Some countries performed extremely well: among middle and high HDI countries, China performed best (with a 70% improvement 1980–2013) and the Republic of the Congo (Brazzaville) worst (with almost no change); among low HDI countries, Cambodia showed most improvement (increasing by 170%) and the DRC least, also with almost no change.

General progress

First, there was progress on most indicators of *empowerment*, including a rise in female to male enrolment rates, mostly falling poverty rates, and a rise in women's share of parliamentary seats. However, while trade union density showed a rise in some countries – such as South Africa and Turkey – it fell elsewhere, such as in Sri Lanka, many Latin American countries and most developed countries. Secondly, there was near universal improvement in *political freedoms* in the 1980s and 1990s, with some reversals since 2010, although the situation in 2015 remained substantially better than in 1980. In 1980, just over a third of countries had electoral democracies, whereas by 2015 this had doubled to two-thirds. Thirdly, economic fluctuations, measured by changes in GDP, became less severe, implying some improvement in *economic insecurity*. Finally, in most countries, *leisure conditions* appeared to improve, as shown by indicators of how much people value leisure, and the per capita availability of consumer durables.

Improvement in some countries, worsening elsewhere

Social relations, as measured by the value people placed on family and friends, and associational life, rose in some countries and fell in others. Mostly the value placed on family and friends rose;




Figure 4. Change in HDI by region, 1980–2013, % per annum.

associational life increased in some countries, such as Taiwan, Colombia and Uganda, but fell in others, including Mexico and China.

In terms of *inequalities*, taking the period as a whole, vertical income inequality within countries rose in the majority of countries in Asia and Latin America, although it fell in Latin American countries in the 2000s. For the period as a whole, it also fell in more countries than it rose in Sub-Saharan Africa (where there is little data), the Middle East and Western Europe. Inter-country inequality fell, and global vertical inequality remained broadly constant from 1988 to 2008 when tax data is used to adjust high incomes (Anand and Segal, 2015; Lakner & Milanovic, 2016). The limited data available on horizontal inequalities show divergent movements. Gender inequality generally fell.

Some indicators showed improvement in *work conditions*, and others not. Unemployment rates rose over the 1980s and 1990s but fell in the 2000s. As far as quality of work is concerned, child labour fell with a positive impact on work quality, but the share of low quality work in the informal sector mostly rose with a negative impact. In the formal sector, labour market reforms tended to reduce the security of employment, and minimum wages were reduced or abandoned in the 1980s but partially restored in the 2000s. In developed countries, the length of the working week fell. The wage share fell almost everywhere, with the decline being greatest for unskilled work and in developing countries (Karabarbounis & Neiman, 2014).

Political insecurity, measured by the number of violent conflicts and refugees, improved somewhat in the post-cold war period (after 1993 until the mid-2000s), but subsequently worsened, especially sharply after 2010.

Mental health, as measured by the suicide rate showed a mixed picture in most regions, but a general worsening in Latin American countries.

Community wellbeing is measured here (negatively) by the homicide rate and deaths by road accidents; and positively by respect for the rule of law and trust in others. Homicide rates were high and worsening in Latin America, and low and improving among developed countries, but there is no information over time for other regions. Road accidents increased in many developing countries, but fell in developed countries. An indicator for the presence and strength of the rule of law is only available from 1996. On average, this fell in Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and North Africa and the Middle East, but rose in sub-Saharan Africa and Western Europe. The majority of developing countries showed a reduction in trust in others between 1980 and 2014. In contrast, the majority of developed countries showed an increase in trust.

Deterioration

One dimension showed universal deterioration: *environmental conditions* as measured by the material footprint and by CO₂ emissions worsened in every region. The material footprint, which is a broad measure, of environmental impact, remained very low in Africa and did not rise very much. It was high and rose sharply in Asia and among high income countries between 1990 and 2008. Carbon emissions stabilised in high income countries from 2008, probably mainly due to the financial crisis.

In sum, universal progress on basic HD was not paralleled by similar progress on the broader dimensions, although there was progress in most countries on some dimensions, including political freedoms, and leisure conditions. The most serious development is the deterioration in environmental conditions, since, if it continues, it is likely to undermine progress on many other dimensions of HD, including basic HD. Rising environmental pressures are likely to increase political and economic insecurities, reduce community wellbeing, and contribute to political authoritarianism. In conclusion, I must emphasise again that the findings depend on the particular indicators chosen to measure the dimensions, and on imperfect data for these indicators.

Section 6: neglected issues

This final section focuses on important issues that, I believe, have been neglected or downplayed in human development analysis and policy, and so offers a guide to areas where further work is needed. The issues fall into four broad categories: social institutions, political conditions, economic policies, and the environment.

Social institutions and social capabilities

The capability approach, which underpins the HD approach, is essentially individualistic: the aim of the capability approach is to advance individual capabilities, and this perspective has informed much of the analysis of HD. It has led to relative neglect of research on societies or communities as a whole. While, in the final analysis, it is the situation of individuals that matter, all individuals live in families, communities and nations, and these collective institutions provide the conditions which determine whether individuals flourish. As Etzioni stated, ‘a basic observation of sociology and psychology is that the individual and the community “penetrate” one another and require one another’ (Etzioni, 1993), p. 65). Because of this interpenetration, it is not possible to separate individuals from society, and to investigate conditions for individual flourishing without also exploring the individual-society connections and the characteristics of societies that support individual HD. Both HD and capability approaches consider the role of social institutions instrumentally, but mostly as a secondary consideration and not as intrinsically important (Sen, 1993; UNDP, 1993).

In this discussion of social institutions, I am not referring to the nature of the state, which has been subject to considerable research, but rather a range of institutions that are neither part of the state nor the private sector. These institutions include families, communities, associations of all sorts, and NGOs; they also include social norms, which are hugely important in influencing behaviour. Social institutions have conceptual and theoretical as well as practical bearing on the HD approach.

The important role of social norms in influencing behaviour raises difficult questions. Individuals’ choices about the lives they live and their day-to-day behaviour are formed socially, influenced by the culture and norms that surround them. While the HD approach is about providing people with choice: ‘*Human development is a process of enlarging people’s choices*’ (UNDP, 1990, p. 1, my italics) – the choices people make are not formed autonomously but are influenced by social norms, by social institutions, by family, and so on. Hence, the HD approach must consider the nature of these social influences and cannot legitimately treat individual choice as independent of them. Therefore it is essential to analyse and evaluate the social norms and institutions which frame individual decision-making, exploring which influence decisions positively, and which negatively, from an HD perspective. Yet we cannot turn to individual decisions to decide on the differentiation between elements that are positive and those that are negative because they are themselves influenced by the social norms and institutions. This presents a conceptual and moral quandary that underlies the HD and capability approach, and indeed individualistic approaches generally, including much of welfare economics.

Besides the conceptual issue, social institutions, including norms, make a large instrumental contribution to HD. For example, families have a huge influence over the health, nutrition, education and aspirations of children: having an educated mother is probably the biggest single input into a child’s HD. Social enterprises/NGOs provide education, health services and so on. Collective organisations – for example associations of poor people – can exert effective pressure on the government or private sector to improve conditions. Organisations of scavengers and of sex-workers, for example, have been shown to improve the earnings and conditions of these groups of highly exploited people significantly (Gooptu, 2002; Thorp, Stewart, & Heyer, 2005). Every dimension of HD is influenced by social organizations and social norms. Of course, we

should not neglect the fact that there are also numerous social institutions that are irrelevant to HD or even ones that contribute to worsening conditions: not all social institutions support HD.

Bringing social institutions and social capabilities into account has potentially far-reaching implications. We need to consider why and how relevant social norms and institutions are formed and their impact, as well as the impact of other institutions, including markets and the media, on these social institutions and social norms. Social aspects should enter into societal evaluations, which they rarely do. It is difficult to get information on the health of a society in contrast to the abundant information about the health of the economy and of individuals. We need to be able to identify complements to and trade-offs between societal wellbeing and advances in other dimensions of HD. Finally, there is the difficult issue, discussed above, of how choices can be validated if they are not autonomous.

Political issues

In some ways, the capability and HD approaches do discuss political issues. Both Sen and Nussbaum have argued that reaching a consensus is the appropriate way to inform societal priorities and government decisions. Sen argues for a ‘reasoned consensus’ arising out of deliberative democracy, while Nussbaum suggests priorities should be determined by an overlapping consensus – broadly a cross-cultural consensus (Nussbaum, 2000; Sen, 1999, 2009). Both seem desirable ways of making decisions, yet they do not reflect the way actual political discussions occur and government decisions are made. The UNDP’s HD approach also avoids real politics and simply states that what is needed is ‘political will’ (see, for example, Griffin & McKinley, 1992). Both approaches thus avoid analyses of the type of political struggles and conflicts that generally underlie progress in advancing HD, in particular the HD of poorer people. To understand the political factors behind HD-decisions, it is necessary to explore power struggles among interest groups, and how effective political movements and collective action for advancing HD emerge. The literature on social movements is helpful here, as is in-depth historical analysis of the political factors that led to the emergence of welfare states in Europe and social advances in developing countries (Baldwin, 1990; Renwick, 2017; Sah, 2003; Tilly, 2004). The politics of regress in HD is also relevant.

Economic strategies

HD has made huge progress as the globally agreed objective of development, in the sense that every country has signed up to the MDGs and SDGs, both of which can be seen as concrete expressions of the HD objective. Yet progress in accepting the HD objective occurred without any challenge to the underlying economic model, as if progress in HD and the nature of the economy were unconnected. The economic model that became dominant in the 1980s – that of market dominance, a small state, budget discipline and so on – remains preminent. There is almost no discussion of the type of structural change and macro policy that might best promote HD. Yet some of the outcomes of the prevailing economic model raise key questions, since the model often leads to growing inequality, high unemployment, reduced social cohesion and a worsening environment, all of which undermine major dimensions of HD. Hence it is important to explore whether alternative economic models, strategies and organisational forms might be identified which avoid these negative effects. Are these negative effects an unavoidable consequence of capitalism and market dominance? And, if so, are there other forms of organisation, such as cooperatives, which might produce a more HD friendly economy? These are difficult and politically challenging issues. Nonetheless, they are questions that need to be considered as the economy forms a critical underpinning of HD.

Environmental issues

Finally, we come to the environment. The basic and very simple premise which should form an intrinsic aspect of HD is that advancing HD involves advancing it for everybody, not only those alive today, but future generations. Once this is accepted, then the HD approach, as currently viewed and assessed, is seriously flawed, since it focuses on HD for those alive today, and appears to ignore the situation of future generations. If we could assume that future generations will be generally better off with better levels of HD than present ones because of technical progress, then the focus on the present might be justified. But, the deteriorating environment suggests the reverse – that they may be seriously worse off, in large part because of current decisions. Hence it is essential to take the situation of future generations into account in current decisions. The requirements have been brilliantly identified in Raworth's 'doughnut' which illustrates what she describes as the 'the safe and just path for humanity', a path which respects both HD of those alive today and critical environmental limits (Raworth, 2012). Incorporating these limits into HD requires rethinking the definition, measurement and monitoring of HD, as well as policies. Moreover, it too has profound implications for the appropriate economic model (Raworth, 2017).

These represent the challenges for advances in human development in the twenty-first century: the social and collective side of HD; the political conditions underlying progress; the relevant economic model, organisation of the economy and economic policy for advance; and, finally, incorporating the environment as an intrinsic part of HD, which will lead to radical change in all of these aspects.

Notes

1. Most important among these were a series of North-South Roundtables organized by Uner Kirdar, and Khadija and Mahbub ul Haq, in the 1980s (Haq & Kirdar, 1986); (Knight & Colletta, 1980) used the term 'human development' referring to a subset of issues, not an overall approach. See also (Griffin & Knight, 1989).
2. I acknowledge with great gratitude the very large contribution of my fellow authors, the late Gustav Ranis and Emma Samman, to the work reported on in this paper.
3. GEM (Gender Empowerment Measure) is a composite measure of women's relative income and access to professional and parliamentary positions. It has been replaced by GII (Gender Inequality Index), which includes measures of reproductive health, empowerment and relative economic status. The GDI measures 'gender gaps in human development achievements by accounting for disparities between women and men in three basic dimensions of human development – health, knowledge and living standards' (<http://hdr.undp.org/en/content/gender-development-index-gdi>, accessed 12.10.2018).
4. For details of methodology and findings see Stewart et al. (2018), Chapter Three.
5. This could be due to the fact that greater equality supports economic growth because of its effects in raising HD, and HD has been taken into account here.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes on contributor

Frances Stewart is professor emeritus of development economics at the University of Oxford.

References

- Alkire, S. (2002). *Valuing freedoms: Sen's capability approach and poverty reduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Anand, S., & Segal, P. (Eds.). (2015). *The global distribution of income. Handbook of income distribution, volume 2*. Amsterdam: Elsevier.

- Baldwin, P. (1990). *The politics of social solidarity: Class bases of the European welfare states 1875–1975*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Bruno, M., Ravallion, M., & Squire, L. (1999). Equity and growth in developing countries: Old and new perspectives on the policy issues. *Policy Research Working Paper*. Washington DC: World Bank.
- Burchardt, T., & Vizard, P. (2011). “Operationalizing” the capabilities approach as a basis for equality and human right monitoring in twenty-first century Britain. *Journal of Human Development and Capabilities*, 12(1), 91–119.
- Camfield, L. (2005). *researching quality of life in developing countries*. Bath: ESRC Research Group on Well-being in Developing Countries.
- Chenery, H., Ahluwalia, M. S., Bell, C. L. G., Duloy, J. H., & Jolly, R. University of Sussex. Institute of Development Studies and World Bank. (1979). *Redistribution with growth: Policies to improve income distribution in developing countries in the context of economic growth*. London: Oxford University Press.
- Cornia, G. A., Jolly, R., & Stewart, F. (1986). *Adjustment with a Human Face*. Oxford: OUP.
- Doyal, L., & Gough, I. (1991). *A theory of human need*. London: Macmillan Education Limited.
- Etzioni, A. (1993). Liberals, communitarians and choices. In A. Etzioni & P. Lawrence (Eds.), *Socio-economics: Towards a new synthesis*. Armonk, New York: M. E. Sharpe.
- Finnis, J., Boyle, J. M., & Grisez, G. (1987). *Nuclear deterrence, morality and realism*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Ghosh, P. (2014). Despite low pay, poor work conditions, garment factories empowering millions of Bangladesh women. *International Business Times*. Retrieved from <http://www.ibtimes.com/despite-low-pay-poor-work-conditions-garment-factories-empowering-millions-bangladeshi-women-1563419>
- Goopu, N. (2002). Sex workers in Calcutta and the dynamics of collective action: Political activism, community identity and group behaviour. In J. Heyer, F. Stewart, & R. Thorp (Eds.), *Group behaviour and development: Is the market destroying cooperation*. Oxford: OUP, 227–252.
- Griffin, K., & McKinley, T. (1992). *Towards a human development strategy*, New York: HDRO. UNDP.
- Griffin, K. B., & Knight, J. B. (1989). *Human development and the international development strategy for the 1990s*. Basingstoke: Macmillan in association with the United Nations.
- Haq, K., & Kirdar, Ü. (1986). *Human development: The neglected dimension*. Islamabad, Pakistan Society for International Development, North South Roundtable.
- Harris, J. (2015). “Developmental capture” of the state: Explaining Thailand’s universal coverage policy. *Journal of Health Politics, Policy & Law*, 40(1), 165–193.
- Harris, J. R., & Todaro, M. P. (1970). Migration, unemployment and development: A two-sector analysis. *American Economic Review*, 60(1), 126–142.
- Hyder, S. (2009). *Women’s financial independence amongst garment workers in Bangladesh: summary of research*. ILO. (1970). *Towards full employment*. Geneva: Author.
- ILO. (1972). *Employment, incomes and equality: A strategy for increasing productive employment in Kenya*. Geneva: Author.
- ILO. (1976). *Employment, growth and basic needs: A one-world problem*. Geneva: Author.
- ILO (1999). *Decent Work, report of the director-general, international labour conference. 87th Session*, Geneva, Author.
- Kabeer, N., Mahmud, S., & Tasneem, S. (2011). Does paid work provide a pathway to women’s empowerment? Empirical findings from Bangladesh. *IDS Working Paper 375*. Sussex: IDS.
- Kakwani, N. (1995). Structural adjustment and performance in living standards in developing countries. *Development and Change*, 26(3), 469–502.
- Karabarbounis, L., & Neiman, B. (2014). The global decline of the labor share. *Quarterly Journal of Economics*, 113, 161–168.
- Knight, P. T., & Colletta, N. J. (1980). *Implementing programs of human development*. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
- Lakner, C., & Milanovic, B. (2016). Global income distribution from the fall of the Berlin wall to the great recession. *World Bank Economic Review*, 30(2), 203–232.
- Lewis, A. (1954). Economic development with unlimited supplies of labour. *Manchester School of Economic and Social Studies*, 22, 139–191.
- Mahalanobis, P. C. (1953). Some observations on the process of growth in national income. *Sankya*, 12(4), 307–312.
- Naraya, D., Patel, R., Schafft, K., Rademacher, A., & Koch-Schulte, S. (2000). *Voices of the poor: Can anyone hear Us?* Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Nussbaum, M. (2007). Human rights and human capabilities. *Human Rights Journal*, 20, 21–24.
- Nussbaum, M. C. (2000). *Women and human development: The capabilities approach*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Persson, T., & Tabellini, G. (1994). Is inequality harmful for growth? *The American Economic Review*, 84(3), 600–621.
- Ranis, G., Stewart, F., & Samman, E. (2009). Country patterns of development on broader dimensions of human development. In K. Basu & R. Kanbur (Eds.), *Arguments for a better world*. Oxford: OUP, 119–138.
- Rawls, J. (1971). *A theory of justice*. Cambridge, Mass: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

- Raworth, K. (2012). A safe and just space for humanity: Can we live inside the doughnut. *OXFAM Discussion Papers*. Oxford: OXFAM.
- Raworth, K. (2017). *Doughnut economics: Seven ways to think like a 21st-century economist*. London: Random House Business.
- Renwick, C. (2017). *Bread for all: The origins of the welfare state*. London: Allen Lane an imprint of Penguin Books.
- Rostow, W. W. (1960). *The stages of economic growth: A non-communist manifesto*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Sah, J. (Ed). (2003). *Social mobilization and mapping of social mobilization in Nepal Kathmandu*. Kathmandu: National Planning Commission.
- Schultz, T. P. (1993). Investments in the schooling and health of women and men: Quantities and returns. *Journal of Human Resources*, 28, 694–734.
- Schultz, T. W. (1963). *The economic value of education*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Seers, D. (1969). The meaning of development. *International Development Review*, 11(4), 3–4.
- Sen, A. (1993). Capability and wellbeing. In M. Nussbaum & A. Sen (Eds.), *The quality of life* (pp. 30–53). Oxford: OUP.
- Sen, A. (2009). *The idea of justice*. London: Allen Lane.
- Sen, A. K. (1985). *Commodities and capabilities*. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
- Sen, A. K. (1999). *Development as freedom (DAF)*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Stewart, F. (1977). *Technology and underdevelopment*. London: Macmillan.
- Stewart, F. (1985). *Planning to meet basic needs*. London: Macmillan.
- Stewart, F. (1995). *Adjustment and poverty: Options and choices*. London: Routledge.
- Stewart, F., Ranis, G., & Samman, E. (2018). *Advancing human development: Theory and practice*. Oxford: OUP.
- Streeten, P. P., Burki, S. J., Haq, M. U. L., Hicks, N., & Stewart, F. (1981). *First things first, meeting basic human needs in developing countries*. New York: OUP.
- Thorp, R., Stewart, F., & Heyer, A. (2005). When and how far is group formation a route out of chronic poverty? *World Development*, 33 (6), 907–920.
- Tilly, C. (2004). *Social movements 1768–2004*. Boulder: Paradigm Publishers.
- UNDP. (1990). *Human development report 1990*. Oxford: OUP.
- UNDP. (1993). *Human development report, people's participation*. Oxford: OUP.
- Williamson, J. (1989). What washington means by policy reform. In J. Williamson (Ed.), *Latin American readjustment: How much has happened*. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 7–20.
- Woodward, D. (1992). *Debt, adjustment and poverty in developing countries*. London: Pinter in association with Save the Children.